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The occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event D has inferential significance. 
We query n sources or sensors who make individual reports about  the occurrence 
or nonoccurrence of D. Their  reports are either mutual ly confirming or there is 
some pat tern  of conflict among them. In this paper we develop expressions 
termed adjusted likelihood ratios which prescribe the inferential or diagnostic 
impact  of the joint  confirming or conflicting reports from the n sources. These 
expressions combine information about  the inferential impact of D (and its 
complement / ) )  with information about  the reliability of each source. We 
only consider the case in which the reporting behavior of any subset of the 
sources is not itself an inferentially significant event. Appropriate independence 
and conditional independence assumptions are necessary. Our formulations of 
adjusted likelihood ratio are applicable to a variety of medical, legal, military, 
and other inferential tasks. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the most straightforward of probabilistic inference tasks one makes 
revisions of the relative ]ikeliness of two or more world states or hypotheses 
on the basis of the established occurrence or nonoccurrence of events 
having inferential impact on these hypotheses. However, in a very large 
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class of real-life probabilistic inference tasks the actual occurrence or non- 
occurrence of any inferential event may  be conjectural. The reason is tha t  
the source or sources of information about this event may be less than 
perfectly reliable for any one of several reasons. Because there is often no 
single perfectly reliable source or sensor, two or more sources are asked to 
determine whether or not some inferential event has occurred. In X-ray 
interpretation, for example, several radiologists may  be asked to determine 
whether or no% a given X-ray image contains a certain indication. In legal 
proceedings, several witnesses may be asked to testify about the occurrence 
or nonoccurrence of some event. In intelligence analysis, more than one 
human source or more than  one mechanical or electronic sensor may be 
used to determine whether or not  some crucial event has occurred. The 
purpose of our paper is to develop formal statements which prescribe the 
inferential impact in the joint report, from two or more unreliable sources, 
about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an inferential event. 
Following is a summarization of the key concepts in our formalizations. 
Together,  these concepts constitute a description of the basic inferential 
problems to which our formalizations are relevant. Because we are dis- 
cussing only a particular aspect of cascaded inference, our notations can 
be kept  relatively simple. We have chosen to keep our notational scheme 
consistent with the one adopted in an earlier paper on the relationships 
between the reliability of a single source and the inferential impact of the 
reports made by  this source (Schum and Du Charme, 1971). 
(1) Consider the single binomial event class {D, D}. Suppose we are 
interested in determining the occurrence or nonoccurrence of event D for 
the inferentiaJL purpose of revising our estimate of the relative likeliness of 
two other events or hypotheses H1 and H2. We assume tha t  H1 and/ /2  are 
mutual ly exclusive but  not necessarily exhaustive. A measure of the 
inferential impact of event D on H1 a n d / / 2  is provided by  the likelihood 
ratio LD = P(D]H~)/P(D[H2)= Pl/P2. For event D (nonoccurrence of 
event D), its inferential impact is given by  the likelihood ratio L~ = 
P(D[HI)/P(DIH2) = (1 - p~)/(1 -- p2). 
(2) When a particular source or sensor, in making reports about events 
D a n d / ) ,  is unreliable to any degree, a distinction must be made between 
the occurrence of event D and the report of the occurrence of event D. The 
necessity for such a distinction is discussed in a previous paper (Schum 
and Du Charme, 1971). A report of the occurrence of event D is to be 
symbolized by  D* and the report of the occurrence of e v e n t / )  is to be 
symbolized by / ) * .  
(3) We will consider a general case in which n sources (or sensors) are 
each asked to determine which one of two events (D o r / ) )  has occurred. 
I t  is important  to note tha t  each source is being queried about the same 
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event pair {D,/)}. We let N = { 1, 2 . . . .  , i, . . . n} be the set of integers 
which identify the sources of information about  the occurrence of D or Z). 
Thus D*~ is the report  made by  source i tha t  event D occurred. Similarly, 
/5"~ is the report  f rom source i tha t  event 1) occurred. On occasion we 
shall refer to the class of reports R - {Rx, R2, • . . , Ri, • • • , R~,} where 
any R~ can be either D*~ or/)*~. The subscript attached to any report thus 
"indicates the source or sensor f rom which the report comes. 
(4) We assume tha t  no one of the n sources is perfectly reliable. Tha t  is, 
every source has, on previous occasions, reported D* when event /3  actually 
occurred and has reported/5" when event D actually occurred. Specification 
of source reliability involves the following conditional probabilities which, 
for later convenience, are given labels which arise in signal detectabil i ty 
theory. The four conditional probabilities for any source i are: 
(a) P(D*~[D) = hi = hit rate, 
(b) P(Z3*~[D) = 1 -- hl = mi  = miss  rate, 
(c) P(/)*i/Z)) = cl = correct rejection rate, 
(d) P(D*i[/)) = 1 - c~ = f~ = false alarm rate. 
Our assumption about  imperfect source reliability means tha t  h~ ~ 1.0 
and tha t  c~ ~ 1.0, for every source i. For reasons which will become 
apparent  when we discuss al l- important independence considerations, the 
best indications of "reliabili ty" for source i are provided by  the ratios 
hi/ f i  and c~/mi. There is a final consideration about source reliability. 
In  some eases a given source might express the extent of his own uncer- 
ta in ty  about the occurrence of events D and Z3. Fox" example, he might say 
tha t  he is 60% sure tha t  D occurred and 40% sure tha t  D occurred. The 
formalizations we develop do not consider this type  of reporting (see Get tys  
and Willke, 1969). We are concerned instead with instances in which every 
source unequivocally reports D* or Z)*. The uncer ta inty about  the actual 
occurrence of events D o r / )  must  be est imated or expressed on the basis 
of a source's previous reporting accuracy. The four conditional probabili- 
ties listed above are formally required for this purpose. 
(5) When a source of information about  D o r / )  is less than  completely 
reliable, an inference about  the relative likeliness of H1 and H2 should 
be based upon reports D* or /)* having adjusted likelihood ratios A~. = 
P(D*IH1)/P(D*IH @ and h~, - - -P(D*]HO/P(f )*IH@. In  their expanded 
form these "adjusted likelihood rat ios" combine information about  source 
reliability (expressed by  h~/f, and ci/m~) with information about  the impact  
of the event being reported (expressed by  the values p~ and P2). 
(6) A crucial factor in our formalizations is the particular pa t te rn  of 
reports made by  the n sources about events D a n d / ) .  First, suppose tha t  
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all n sources make the same report (i.e., they all make reports D* or they 
all make reports/3*). We shall call this the confirming case since all sources 
are consistent in making the same report. In the second case, suppose tha t  
r >_ 1 of the sources make reports D* but  the remaining in - r) sources 
make reports/3'*. This case will be called the conflicting case. In the present 
paper we develop formal statements which prescribe the inferential or 
diagnostic impact in the joint report, from two or more sources, of events 
in the class {D,/3}. We consider both the confirming and conflicting cases. 
Each of the statements we develop is in the form of an adjusted likelihood 
ratio (A). A value of A will combine information about the reliability of 
each source with information about the inferential impact of events in the 
class {D,/3}. 
MAJOR INDEPENDENCE ISSUES 
We begin by  considering ways of characterizing the individual and the 
joint behavior of sources or sensors making repol'ts D* or D*. The concepts 
of independence and conditional independence are crucial in these considera- 
tions. We recall tha t  events A and B are said to be (stochastically) inde- 
pendent iff (if and only if) P(AB) = P(A)P(B). If this relationship holds, 
then P(A IB) =: P(A) and P(BIA ) = P(B). In this case it is frequently said 
that  A and B a~re totally independent. Events A and B are said t;o be condi- 
tionally independent, given another event C, iff P(ABIC ) = P(AIC)P(BtC ). 
I t  can easily be demonstrated that  conditional independence of A and B 
(given C) does not imply total independence of A and B nor does total  
independence imply conditional independence. Our present problem of 
determining the iI~ferential impact of a joint report from unreliable sources 
will be a prime example showing the absolute necessity of making careful 
and separate independence assumptions about various aspects of source 
bghavior. Indeed, lack of precision in stating the independence conditions 
we wish to assume will lead us to conclusions about adjusted likelihood 
ratio whose consequences are not at all congenial to intuition in a variety 
of conditions. There is a large class of independence issues of concern in 
cascaded inference (Schum and Du Charme, 1971). We now list two inde- 
pendence issues of importance in describing the individual and joint be- 
havior of our reporting sources. Independence issues crucial in other stages 
of cascaded inference are discussed in a later section. 
1. Report and Event Nonindependence 
Our first formal requirement is tha t  the individual reports from each 
source actually convey information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence 
of event D. This requirement can be expressed as an assumption about the 
total  nonindependence of reports (D*) and events (D). 
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Assumption 1. Consider the class {D*~, D} where i is any source in 
N = {1, 2 . . . . .  n}. We assume that  the class {D*~, D} is not an inde- 
pendent class for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We note that  this assumption 
implies tha t  the class {D'i, /)} is also not an independent class for any 
i =  1,2,  . . . , n .  
Statistical independence can be interpreted as a failure of conditioning 
of one event by  another (Pfeiffer and Schum, 1973). Assumption 1 simply 
states tha t  reports from any single source are conditional upon the events 
being reported; tha t  is, P(D*ilD) ~ P(D*) and P(/)*~I/)) # P(D*). An 
easily verified implication of Assumption 1 is tha t  P(D*~ID ) = hi ~ fi = 
P(D*ilD), and that  P(/)*il/)) = ci ~ mi = P(D*IID). I t  has been shown 
that,  with the exception of certain unusual cases discussed elsewhere, 
the condition hi = f~ (implying ci = mi) for any source i causes a total  
destruction of the inferential impact of reports from this source (Schum 
and Du Charme, 1971). I t  can be argued, therefore, tha t  the condition 
h~/fi = 1.0 might best be taken as the condition of zero reliability for 
source i. 
In our formalizations of adjusted likelihood ratio (h) in both cases we 
will assume that  hi > fi  (which implies that  c~ > m~). The reason for this 
assumption is that  hl > f~ means that  the report D* will favor inferentially 
the same hypothesis that  event D favors (the same can be said about / )*  
and / ) ) .  If hl < fi  (or ci < ml) a condition called an impact reversal occurs, 
In an impact reversal a source report favors one hypothesis while the event 
being reported favors another hypothesis. We simply wish to exclude these 
possible impact reversals in our developments. I t  does seem likely that  few 
real-life inference systems would employ sources whose hit rates might 
be smaller than their false-alarm rates. Impact  reversals are possible b~t 
seem pathological or unlikely in most inferential activity. 
2. Source Behavior, by Itself, Has No Inferential Significance 
Our second assumption is more subtle than the first and it requires 
careful statement.  We wish to consider situations in which all of the in- 
ferential impact upon HI and H2 resides in the events {D, /)} being re- 
ported upon and not in the individual or joint behavior of the sources or 
sensors making reports about D and D. The expressions we develop for A 
will tell us how much of the total impact in events D and b [expressed by  
LD - - ' - -  Pl/P2 and L~ = (1 - pl)/(1 - p~)] we should incorporate in our 
inferences about the relative likeliness of H1 and H2. Exact ly how much 
of this total  impact we can incorporate will depend upon the reliability 
of the sources making reports D* and D*. When source behavior, by  itself, 
has no inferential significance we can expect expressions for A to be appro- 
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priately bounded by  LD and Ls  in both the confirming and conflicting cases. 
There are two varieties of source behavior we wish to rule out. A single 
appropriate conditional independence assumption will allow us to make 
these exclusions. First, we wish to specify that  the reporting behavior of 
any subset of sources (including single-member subsets) is not contingent 
upon any hypothesis about which inferences are being made. For example, 
we exclude possible instances in which a radiologist's hit or false-alarm 
rate might depend upon what illness (Hi) a patient has. Second, we will 
require the source reports to be mutually independent given event D and 
given even t / ) .  As an example, suppose five radiologists read and interpret 
X-ray images for us. We will require tha t  the reporting behavior of any 
subset (single-member subsets included) of the radiologists is not contin- 
gent upon the reporting behavior of any other subset, both  when event D 
is true and when even t /5  is true. The reason for requiring mutual  source 
independence given D and given JO is that ,  by  Assumptio~a 1, the reports 
from each individual source are to be conditional upon D an d / ) .  
I t  may appear tha t  we must make two separate assumptions. However, 
the following statement incorporates both exclusions we wish to make. 
Assumption 2. Consider the class E = IR1, R2, . . . , Rn, Hk} where 
any R~ = D*~ ,or/)*~, and/c = 1, 2. We assume that  class E is conditionally 
independent, given D and given D, for H1 and H2. For any subclass of the Ri 
and for/c = 1, 2, this assures: 
i 
Reading both  of the above expressions from left to right we first observe 
the provision tha t  Hk(k = 1, 2) fails to condition either P((h R~ID ) or 
i 
P((h RdD) for any subset of the R~. As an illustration of the consequences of 
i 
not making this assumption, suppose that  P ( ~  R~ID (~ Itk) ¢ P((h R~ID ) 
i i 
for some subset of the R~. When this is true, it can easily be deduced that  
P(H~I 55 R~ ~, D) ¢ P(Hk[D). In words, this inequality means that  there 
i 
is inferential impact on H~ of the ioint report  ((h Ri) in excess of the 
i 
impact in the event D being reported. As mentioned above, in our formaliza- 
tions of adjusted likelihood ratio we wish to exclude instances in which 
the reporting behavior of one or more of the sources is actually an event 
itself having inferential significance regarding H~ and / /2 .  Reporting be- 
havior as an inferential event is a problem which appears to be of some 
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importance in certain inferential systems and it is briefly discussed for 
single sources in Sehum and Du Charme (1971). 
The second provision is expressed by  the product rule for conditional 
probabilities in each of the above equality expressions. These product 
rules embody the assumption of source mutual  independence, given D 
and g iven/ ) .  To illustrate consequences of the failure of this assumption, 
3 3 
consider three sources i = 1, 2, 3, and suppose P( (h REID) ~ ~ P(R~[D). 
i=1  i = 1  
One particular instance in which this product rule may fail to hold is the 
case in which P(R~ ~ R21D ~ Ra) # P(RI ~ R21D). This latter inequality 
implies tha t  P(R31D ~ R, ~ R2) ~ P(R31D). Suppose Ra = D*3, then 
P(D*alD ~ R1 ~ R~) ~ P(D*a[D) = ha. In other words, the hit rate for 
Source 3 is influenced by  reports R, and R2 from Sources 1 and 2 in this 
case. I t  is this sort of mutual  influence among the sources tha t  we wish to 
exclude. 
Finally, we note that  Assumption 2 does not imply the complete or un- 
conditional independence of the Re. In other words, we cannot deduce from 
Assumption 2 that  P(~ Re) = ~ P(R¢), for any subset of the R~. This is 
i i 
not crucial in our development of A because, under Assumption 1, we 
suppose that  every R~ is conditioned by  D a n d / ) .  
ADJUSTED LIKELIHOOD RATIO: CONFIRMING CASE 
We first consider the case in which there is complete reporting agree- 
ment among the n sources. All n sources report the same condition, i.e., 
every Re = D*e or every R~ = /)*e. We recall our initial provision that ,  
for any source i, he ~ 1.0 and ce ~ 1.0. Our task is to find expressions 
which prescribe the inferential impact, on the mutually exclusive hypothe- 
ses H1 and //2, of the joint confirming reports from the n sources. We 
begin with the following definition. 
Definition 1. Suppose Re = D'i, for every source i. The inferential 
impact on H1 and H~ of these n confirming reports is prescribed by  the 
adjusted likelihood ratio 
A[n(D*)] = P [i=~ D*e]HI] / P [~=~-~I D*eIH2 ]. 
If R~ =/)*e,  for every source i, the inferential impact on H1 and H= of 
these confirming reports is prescribed by  the adjusted likelihood ratio 
A[n(Jg*)] = P [i=A D*~IH~] / P [i~=I D*~IH2]. 
A PROBLE~vI IN CASCADED INFERENCE 411 
To illustrate the development of adjusted likelihood ratio for confirming 
reports we resh4ct our a t tent ion to A[n(D*)]. The development of A[n(/)*)] 
is similar in all respects. For simplification we let F = ~ D*~. For any k 
i = 1  
75 
we can write: P[ ~ D*ilHk] = P(FIH~) = P(F ~ Hl~)/P(H~). Then, 
i = 1  
P(F ~ Hk) = P(F ~ D ~ Hk) ÷ P(F ~ D ~ Hk) 
= P(F]D ~ H~)P(DIHk)P(H~ ) + P(FID ~ Hk)P(DIHk)P(Hk ). 
Then, b y  defimtion, 
P(F1Hk ) = P(FID (-~ H~)P(DiHk) + P(FID ~ Hk)P(DIHk). 
Under Assumption 2 we can write: P(FIHk ) = P(FID)P(DIH~ ) -t- P(FID) 
P(DIH~ ). Also under Assumption 2, P(FID ) = [~ P(D*~ID ) and P(FID ) 
i = l  
= [l P(D* ID). Thus, 
i = 1  
P ~ D*~IHk l] P(D*~ID)P(DIHk) + ~ P * - - -= (D ~ID)P(DIH~). 
i = 1  
i = l  i = l  
This development holds for any/~, so we can write: 
[I P(D*~ID) P(DIH1) ÷ . .  P(D*~]D)- P(DIH1) 
h[n(D*)] = Li=l j ~=1 (1) 
P(D*~ID P(DIH2) -~ (D*i  P(/)[H2) 
Various al ternative forms of Eq. (1) will prove useful. We recall tha t  
P(D*~]D) = hi (the "hi t"  rate  for source i) and tha t  P(D*ilD) = f~ (the 
"false a larm" rate for source i). We let A~ = hi/f~ be the hit rate relative to 
the false-alarm rate for source i. Also, let Pl = P(DIHI) and p2 = P(DIH~), 
P(DIHI ) = 1 - pi, and P(DIH2 ) = 1 - p2. Then we can express A[n(D*)] 
al ternatively as: 
A[n(D*)]  = ( l a )  
A~ p2 -t- (1 - -  p2) 
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p i + a  
4 1  
4 1  
(lb) 
- , where a = (lc) p~+ a 
n 
provided that  1] A~ ~ 1. In all discussions of A[n(D*)] we assume that  
i=1 
hs > fs for any source i (i.e., A~ > 1, all i). In Eq. (lc) this means tha t  
0 < a < ~ .  
Using the same development and assumptions we can express A[n(Jg*)] 
a s :  
= ( 2 )  
A[n(/)*)] [i=fI p(b, lD) ] p(DlH~) + [~=~l P(D, [D) ] P(D[H~) 
We recall tha t  P(D*s[D) = c~ ( the"correc t"  rejection rate for source i) 
and that  P(/)*~]D) = m~ (the "miss" rate for source i). We let B~ = ci/mi 
indicate the correct rejection rate relative to the miss rate for source i. 
Then, alternatively, 
i~1  ( 2 a )  
n ~ 
= p l + ~ ,  where ~ =  [I Bi/1 - I~ Bs (2b) 
p2 4 i=1  i ~ l  
n 
provided that  H Bi ¢ 1. The previous requirement h~ > f~ implies tha t  
i = l  
cl > ms (i.e., Bs > 1, for every i). This means that  -- ~ < ¢~ < --1 in 
Eq. (2b). We recall that  the reason for requiring As > 1 (all i) in A[n(D*)] 
and B~ > 1 (all i) in A[n(/)*)] is to rule out "pathological" instances in 
which an event points inferentially to one hypothesis but  the report of 
this event points inferentially to the other hypothesis. Any source whose 
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hit rate is less than its false alarm rate can cause "impact reversals" of 
the sort mentioned previously. 
Discussion of the Confirming Case 
In the follo~4ng comments we describe various properties of adjusted 
likelihood ratio in the confirming case. The first comment should assist 
the reader in determining why special care in making assumptions about 
independence and conditional independence was necessary. 
1. Limiting Values of A[n(D*)] and A[n(/)*)] 
Using Eq. (le), we observe that, if A~ > 1 for all i, then A[n(D*)] is 
bounded by the values I and pl/p2. As H A~ is made larger, a goes to 
i = l  
zero and A[n(D*)] approaches pl/p2. As H A i  approaches 1, a increases 
i = 1  
without limit and A[n(D*)] approaches 1. Thus, if p~ > p2, then 1 < 
h[n(D*)] < pl/p2. If pl > p~, then pl/p2 < A[n(D*)] < 1. Similar argu- 
ments show that h[n(/)*)] is bounded by the values 1 and 1 - pl/1 -- p2 
when B~> 1, for every i. When p~>p2, then ( 1 - p ~ ) / ( 1 - p 2 ) <  
A[n(l)*)] < 1. When p~ < p2, then 1 < n[n(D*)] < (1 -- p~)/(1 -- p2). 
We now ask why we should expect these particular bounds on adjusted 
likelihood ratio in the confirming case given our assumptions. Suppose 
the n sources (each one not completely reliable) agree and make reports 
D*. These n confirming reports all refer to the occurrence of the same 
event D. If D actually occurred, its total inferential impact on H~ and H2 
is indicated by the ratio pi/p2. Now, our Assumption 2, that reporting 
behavior given D and D is not contingent upon any H~, rules out instances 
in which adjusted likelihood ratio could, legitimately, provide impact over 
and above the impact of event D. Recall the example showing that, when 
any R~ is conditioned by any Hk, the reporting behavior of the sources 
has inferential significance itself. We are requiring also that the joint 
confirming report should provide no inferential impact in excess of the 
impact of event D. We wish our models to reflect the fact that all n reports 
refer to the same event and that no report or subset of reports contain 
inferentiM information not already contained in event D. The model for 
A(n(D*)] shown above is consistent in this respect. A[n(D*)] prescribes how 
much of the total impact of event D (on H~ and H2) we should apply in 
revising our opinions about the relative likeliness of H~ and H~ on the basis 
of the joint confirming report. How much of this total impact we can apply 
depends upon the reliability of the sources. 
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Now, with only slight modification, we could have stated Assumption 2 
in a manner which leads to entirely different consequences in both the 
confirming and conflicting cases. Suppose we had simply required that the 
report class R = {R1, R2 . . . .  , R~} be independent conditional upon 
H~, for k = 1, 2. Under this assumption we can write, for the case in which 
all sources report D*, 
P [ ~  D*~[H~] '~ [P(D*~,H~)] '~ 
A[n(D*)] = i = 1  = 1 v ~  p * = 1-[  A D * , ,  
P [ a D*ilH2 ] ~ 1[ (D ~IH2)] "~ i = 1  
i = 1  
where AD,~ is the adjusted likelihood ratio for the report D* from the single 
source i. 
7b 
It can easily be shown that IF[ AD,~ is not bounded by values prescribing 
i=1 
the impact of event D, even when hi < 1 and ci < 1 for every source i. 
The alternative assumption stated in the previous paragraph does not 
imply the requirement in our original Assumption 2 that the R~ be mutually 
independent given D and given D, under hi and//2. Thus, our Assumption 2 
also rules out instances in which there may be inferential impact in the 
joint reporting behavior of the sources which is not due to the influence 
of H1 or//2. The assumption leading to the condition A[n(D*)] = ~ AD.~ 
i=1 
fails to rule out this possible additional impact and so we expect that ad- 
justed likelihood ratio would not be bounded by the total impact of events 
{D, 
2. Contingency of A[n(D*)] and A[n(/))*] upon 
Specific Values of pl and p2 
Equations (lc) and (2b) make clear the functional dependence of 
A[n(D*)] and A[n(/)*)] upon specific values of p~ and p2. This means, for 
example, that in prescribing the impact of event D, we must have P(DIH~ ) 
= pl and P(DIH2) = p2. Merely prescribing the likelihood ratio LD = 
P(DIH~)/P(DIH2) = pl/p2 for event D will not suffice. Although prescrib- 
ing the ratio L9 may be an easier behavioral task in many instances, LD 
suppresses information about how probable the event is under both H~ 
and H2. It happens that the extent to which source unreliability degrades 
inferential impact depends upon how probable an event is under both 
H~ and//2. Figure i shows A[n(D*)] as a function of a for two events D~ 
and D2. For event D~, p~ = 0.9 and p2 = 0.09. For event D~, p~ = 0.2 and 
p2 = 0.02. Notice that, although LD~ = LD, = 10, event D2 is more ira- 
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Fro. 1. AN(D*)] as a function of a in two special eases. 
probable than  event D1 under H1 and H2. For every a > 0, the inferential 
impact  in the ioint report of D2 is less than  the impact  in the joint report  
of D1. In  general, the more improbable an event is under H1 a n d / / 2  the 
more seriously degraded is the inferential impact  in reports of this event 
b y  sources having some fixed level of unreliability. 
3. Adding Additional Reporting Sources 
We can consider the n sources to be a reporting or detection "sys tem."  
n 
Under our pa¢cicular set of assumptions [ [  As represents the combined 
i = l  
hit rate relative to false alarm rate of this entire system. Similarly, l ]  B~ 
i = 1  
represents the combined correct rejection rate relative to the miss rate for 
the system. Recall our assumption tha t  As > 1 (which implies B~ > 1) 
for every source i. Using a representation like Figure 1 one can easily 
determine the inferential effect of adding sources with known A i if the 
reports from these additional sources are confirming. For example, suppose 
3 
we have  n = 3 sources with [ [  Ai = 11, i.e., a = 0.1. All three sources 
i = 1  
report  the occurrence of event D whose pl and p2 values are those for 
event D1 in Figure 1. We find tha t  A[3(D*)] = 5.26. We decide to query 
4 
an additional source with A~ = 4. Now, 1] As = 44 and a = 0.023. I f  
i=1 
the additional source agTees with the other three sources, A[4(D*)] = 8.17. 
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ADJUSTED LIKELIHOOD RATIO: CONFLICTING CASE 
Again, let N = {1, 2, . . . n} be the set of integers which identify the 
n sources of information about  the occurrence or nonoccurrence of D. Let  
the class {I, J} represent any parti t ion of N such tha t  set I contains 
exactly r members  (where 1 < r < n) and set J contains exactly (n - r) 
members.  In  the conflicting case we are concerned with the joint occurrence 
of reports from two classes: the class { D*~: i C I} and the class -* " {D ~:3 C J} .  
Members  of index set I represent the r sources which report  D* and mere- 
bets of index set J represent the (n - r) sources which report  D*. For 
any source i C I we assume h~/f~ = A~ > 1, and for any source j C J we 
assume c~/m~ = Bj > 1. 
Definition 2. Suppose I represents the r sources making reports D* and 
J represents the n -- r sources making reports D ,  where 1 < r < n. The 
inferential impact  on H~ and H~ of the joint conflicting reports from these 
n sources is prescribed by  the adjusted likelihood ratio: 
P [(i~iD i) [~ (jE~j 181 ] 
h ( / , J )  = 
We continue to make Assumptions i and 2 as s tated at the outset. We 
will simply list al ternative forms of A(I, J) since its development proceeds 




[ H P(D*~[D) 
P(D*~]/)) 
P(DIHx)+[.~j P(D*~ID) ] P(D]H1) 
P(D]H2) + P(D%ID) P(b]H~) 
With notational  conventions already established we can write: 
A(I,j) = [i~rAil Pl + [j~e]Bj] (1-  Pl) 
p2 + [jHjB~] (1 - p2) 
(a) 
(3a) 
In  the interests of further simplification we let A~ = [ I  Ai and B j  = 
1] Bj. Tha t  is, A~ is the combined hit rate relative to false alarm rate for 
jEJ 
all r sources reporting D* and B j  is the combined correct rejection rate 
relative to miss rate  for all (n -- r) sources reporting D*. Thus, 
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where 
Arpi + B j(1 - pl) 
i ( I , J )  = Azp2 + Bj(1 - p2) 
p~[(Ar/Bj - 1] + 1 
p2[(AI/Bj - 1] + 1 
= (p~ + ~ ) / ( ~  + ~), 
= [ ( A ~ / B ~ ) -  ~1-~, 




Discussion of the Conflicting Case 
1. Inferential Direction and Strength of A(I, J).  
Using Eq. (3d) we can establish boundary conditions for A(I, J) .  If we 
fix B j  and let A± increase without limit, 7 approaches zero and A([, J) 
approaches p~/p2. Fixing AI and letting B j  increase without limit makes 
~, approach the value --1 and A(I, J)  approach the ratio (1 - pl)/(1 -- p2). 
When p~ > p2, then (1 - p~)/(1 - p2) < A(I, J) < pl/p2; when pl < p2, 
then p~/p2 < A(I, J)  < (1 - pl)/(1 - p2). Thus, subject to the assump- 
tions made at the outset, the inferential impact of the joint conflicting 
report  is bounded by  the impact of event D (prescribed by  p~/p2) and the 
impaet o f / )  (prescribed by  (1 - pl)/(1 - p2)). 
We must now consider the problem of finding the inferential direction of 
a joint conflicting report. By specifying the inferential "direction" of any 
report we simply mean specifying the hypothesis (H~ or H2) under which 
the report is most likely. We say a report "points toward" or "favors" 
the hypothesis under which the report is most likely. The inferential 
direction of a joint conflicting report depends upon A± and B j  as well as 
upon p~ and p2. We first note, using Eq. (3e), tha t  when A1 = B j, then 
A(I, J)  = 1 regardless of the value of p~ and p2. Thus, a ioint conflicting 
report has no inferential impact when A~ = Bj.  Now, when A1 > Bj,  
the joint conflicting report will favor whichever hypothesis event D 
favors. (Recall tha t  the r sources, Mth  combined hit rate relative to false 
alarm rate AI, all reported the occurrence of event D.) When A± < B j, 
then the joint conflicting report will favor whichever hypothesis e v e n t / )  
favors. (The n - r sources, with combined correct reiection rate to miss 
rate B], all reported the occurrence of event /).) From Eq. (3e) we can 
see that  AI > B j  makes [(A~/Bj) - 1] > 0 so that  A(I, J)  > 1 when 
p~/p2 > 1 and A(/, J )  < 1 when p~/p2 < 1. Thus, when A~ > B j, the 
inferential direction of h(I ,  J )  is the same as the inferential direction of 
event D. Similarly, when B j  > AI in Eq. (30), then [(Ar/Bj)  -- 1] < 0. 
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This means tha t  A(I, J )  > 1 when p2 > pl (i.e., (1 - pl) /(1 - p2) > 1) 
and A(I, J )  < 1 when p2 < p~ (i.e., (1 - p0 / (1  - p2) < 1). Thus, when 
Bj  > At, A(I, J) points inferentially to the same hypothesis as does 
e v e n t / ) .  
2. "Majority Rule" by Itself is Inappropriate as an Indication 
of Inferential Direction in the Conflicting Case 
Equat ion (3d) makes it clear tha t  the relative sizes of Az = ~ A~ and 
iE£  
B~ = l ]  Bj determine the inferential direction of joint conflicting reports 
j ~ J  
rather  than  the numbers of members  r in I and n - r in J .  One can easily 
show tha t  r > n - r does not imply  A~ > B], and, tha t  r < n - r does 
not imply Az < Bj.  The result is tha t  one should "side" inferentially with 
the major i ty  report iff the joint reliability of the major i ty  sources exceeds 
the joint reliability of the sources in the minority. Thus, source reliability 
is more impor tant  than  the extent of source agreement in our assessment 
of the inferential strength and direction of conflicting reports. This means 
tha t  the practice of using an odd number  of sources to resolve potential  
reporting conflicts ignores what  is crucial; namely, source reliability. I t  
also means tha t  some thought  should be given, in civil judicial proceed- 
ings, about  whether or not the concept of "preponderance of evidence" is 
interpreted correctly. The number  of witnesses testifying is not as crucial 
as their reliabilities. 
3. An Example of Impact Determination in the Conflicting Case 
Figure 2 shows log10 A[I, J]  as a function of ~/for the special case in which 
P(DIH 0 = pt = 0.60 and P(D[HO = p2 = 0.15. Log10 a[I; J] is plotted 
in an effort to remove some of the natural  a symmet ry  of A values about  
1.0, the point of zero inferentiM impact.  Notice tha t  7 is undefined in 
.6 
Log io ..A_ [I, J ] .4.2._ ~ r  
-4 -3 -2 -I 
- I I r i I I I r-- 
J z 3 4 7" 
i_2 
FAVORS H z "-.4 
FIG. 2. Log10 A[[,J] as a function of c~ in the special case pl = 0.60 and p2 = 0.15. 
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(--1, 0). This arises because both A~ and B~ are positive values. In this 
special case event D favors H1 and event D favors//2.  A joint conflicting 
report log10 A[I, J] > 0 favors H1. Such values occur when ~ >_ 0 (i.e., 
when Ar > B.s). A ioint conflicting report with log,0 A[I, J] < 0 favors 
H2. These values occur when ~, <_ - 1  (i.e., when AI < B j). A representa- 
tion'such as Figure 2 can be used to find the change in inferential strength 
and direction of a joint conflicting report when additional sources, each 
with known values of A~ or Bj, are added. We note tha t  in the conflicting 
ease, as well as in the confirming case, tha t  A depends upon p, and p2 
rather than upon the ratio of these values. 
OTHER CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE ISSUES 
Independence issues arise, other than those previously mentioned, when 
we at tempt to evaluate a current joint report in the light of previous evi- 
dence. In most inference situations one's evidence or knowledge, prior to 
the acquisition of a current repol~t or observation, consists of a melange 
of verified and unverified reports. Our task is to determine the extent to 
which any of this prior knowledge should further condition the informa- 
tion we are now using to assess the impact of our current joint report. 
The models for adjusted likelihood ratio in both the confirming and con- 
flicting cases make it clear that  we need two classes of information in order 
to assess the inferential impact of a joint report. The first ldnd of informa- 
tion concerns the inferential impact of the event being reported. This impact 
is specified by the values pl and p2. The second type of information con- 
cerns the reliability of the sources or observers making reports about the 
occurrence or nonoccurrence of the current event of concern. The reliability 
of a source is indicated by its hit and false-alarm rates. Our specific concern 
is with cases in which values indicating event impact and source reliability 
have some prebabilistic linkage with prior evidence. The following com- 
ments are intended merely to alert the reader to the conditional indepen- 
dence issues involved. 
Let T represent the class of all relevant events Et known to have occurred 
prior to a current joint report. Let U represent the class of relevant un- 
verified reports R~ from sources with less than perfect reliability. By 
relevant we mean that  these events and reports have impact on inferences 
involving two disjoint hypotheses H1 and H2. We let S represent our entire 
set of prior evidence, where 
Suppose the class {Dy, I3y} includes a current event and its complement, 
and the class {D*~,,/3"~,} consists of reports of either of these two current 
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events made by  source i (whose reliability is less than perfect). Further,  
suppose that  we have n _> 1 reports of events {Dy, /3y} and we wish to 
determine adjusted likelihood ratio A in either the conflicting or confirm- 
ing cases. We note tha t  when n = 1 we have, trivially, the confirming ease. 
In addition to the independence and conditional independence issues 
mentioned at the outset of this paper we have the following three considera- 
tions involving conditional independence. 
(1) In evaluating the inferential impact of events Dy and L3y we must 
ask whether or not any subset of the prior evidence in set S would condi- 
tion D~ and/3~ under any hypothesis Hk. Let  s be any subset of events or 
reports in S. Taking Dy, for example, if P(Dv]Hk ('h s) = P(DylI-Ik ) for 
every s C S, then the impact of Dy on Hk is not conditioned by  prior 
evidence. That  is, Dy and S are conditionally independent given Hk. If 
there is some s for which P(D,,IHk ~ s) ~ P(D~IH~), then Dy and s are 
nonindependent conditional upon Hk. The problem of coping with condi- 
tional nonindependence among events has been discussed previously 
(Edwards, 1963; Schum, 1966; Schum, 1969; Sehum, Southard, and 
Wombolt, 1969). Possible conditional nonindependence involving a current 
event and an unverified report (or reports) involves complexities that ,  to 
the authors' knowledge, have not yet  been treated systematically. This 
problem seems worthy of consideration, however, since it is easy to imagine 
many instances in which one or more items of unverified prior evidence 
may condition a current event being evaluated. 
D i from source i must be condi- (2) We noted that  reports D*i and -* 
tioned by  events D a n d / )  otherwise these reports from this source can have 
no inferential impact. Our development of A in the confirming and con- 
flicting cases assumed that  hi = P(D*ilD) and ci = P(D i[D), for any 
source i, were not conditioned by any hypothesis Hk. There may be in- 
stances in which one may be advised to evaluate h~ and cl for current reports 
D*,, and/)*~, in the light of some subset s of prior evidence. There appear 
to be two conditional independence issues. 
(a) If P(D*yjD~F'~ s )=  P(D*~iIDy) for every s C S, then hi (hit 
rate on D*~ for source i) is not conditioned by  prior evidence. Similarly 
P(D ~JD~ s)= P(D*~ID~) for every s C S means that  ci (correct 
rejection rate on/)*~ for source i) is not conditioned by  (i.e., is independent 
of) prior evidence. Coping with this conditional independence issue in- 
volves an examination of prior evidence to see whether or not there are 
previous inferentially relevant events or reports which would cause us to 
revise our estimates of the reliability parameters for any source making a 
current report. 
(b) There may be instances in which the joint consideration of some 
hypothesis Hk and a subset s of prior evidence may cause us to revise our 
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estimates of the reliability parameters for some source making a current 
D .  - ,  - report. Formally, if P(D*y~IDy ~ s ~ H~) = P( ~ID,), and if P(D ~lDy 
s ~ Hk) = P(/)*~j/)~) for every s C S and for every H~, then hi and 
cl for current reports D*y¢ and -* D y~ are conditionally independent of the 
joint occurrence of any subset of prior evidence under every hypothesis. 
We note tha t  conditional independence involving s or Hk by  themselves 
does not imply conditional independence involving the joint consideration 
of s and Hk. 
(3) In our discussions of A in the confirming and conflicting eases we 
assumed that  the reports about the occurrence of D a n d / 3  from n >_ 2 
sources were mutually independent given D a n d / ) .  Tha t  is, the sources 
neither decide among themselves what to report  nor does any single source 
make his report  contingent upon what other sources report. We can con- 
ceive of instances in which the joint reporting behavior of n ~ 2 sources 
may  be conditioned by  some s, some H~, or by  the joint consideration of 
some s and Hk. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have discussed multisource A for the ease in which values of A are 
bounded by  the inferential impact of events D o r / )  being reported by  the 
sources. These bounds on A occur subject to the independence and condi- 
tional independence assumptions mentioned at the outset. The reader has 
surely noticed tha t  there is a standard form of A which appears in every 
case. This s tandard form is: 
A = (pl + vk)/(p2 + vk). (4) 
In this standard form of A, vk is a source reliability parameter  whose value 
in special case k depends upon the number of sources, their individual 
values of At and Bj, and the pat tern of reports made. Table 1 below sum- 
marizes values of parameter  vk and the range of values for v~ in various 
special cases. We emphasize tha t  these values of v~ in Table 1 are contingent 
upon our independence and conditionM independence assumptions. Values 
Pl and P2 in Eq. (4) are the piobabilities of event D given H1 and H2, 
respectively. 
We derived statements which prescribe the inferential impact in a joint 
confirming or conflicting report from n sources, each with less than  perfect 
reporting accuracy. Our use of the term "joint"  report  may not be com- 
pletely desirable since it may  suggest that  all n reports must be available 
simultaneously. Using Eq. (4) and the v~ shown in Table 1 we can easily 
see how the inferential impact in any n reports can be assessed sequentially 
over time. We have already seen one example of this process in the dis- 
eussion of "adding additional sources" in the confirming ease. First suppose 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF VALUES OF SOURCE ~:~ELIABILITY PARAMETF.R Yk IN 
VAmous SPECIAL CASES 
Case Definition of ve Range of v 
(1) Single source re- vl = [A1 - 1] -~ v~ ~ 0 
ports D* 
(2) Single source re- v2 = [(l/B1) - 1] -1 v2 < - 1 
ports/5" 
(3) A l lnsources re -  [ [ I  ]-1 v~>_0 
port D* v~ = A~ - i 
Li=I  
port./)* v4 = 1 B] -- 1 
j=I 
(5) Conflicting case: r 
sources report D*, 
n -- r sources re- 
port D*. 
v.~ ~ 0, when ] ]  Ai 
> H Bi. 
y~J 
v~ < --1, when 
~ Ai < f l  B~. 
i EI y EJ 
Note. We have assumed Ai = h~/fi > 1, B~ = cj/my > 1, where: hl = hit rate for 
source i, f/ = false-alarm rate for source i, c] = correct rejection rate for source j, m] = 
miss rate for source j, I = set of all r sources making reports D*, J = set of all n -- r 
sources making reports/)*. 
t h a t  a s ingle  source ,  w h o s e  h i t  a n d  f a l s e - a l a r m  r a t e s  a re  k n o w n  to  us, 
r e p o r t s  D*. W e  can  c a l c u l a t e  A us ing  E q .  (4) w i t h  p a r a m e t e r  vl. S o m e  t i m e  
la te r ,  t w o  o t h e r  sources  w i t h  k n o w n  h i t  a n d  f M s e - M a r m  ra t e s  also r e p o r t  
D*. W e  can  r ev i se  A us ing  E q .  (4) a n d  v3 w i t h  n = 3 s ince  t h e  t h r e e  sources  
are  c o n f i r m i n g  a b o u t  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  of  e v e n t  D.  N o w  s u p p o s e  t h a t  a f o u r t h  
sou rce  w i t h  k n o w n  co r r ec t  r e j e c t i o n  a n d  miss  r a t e s  r epo r t s  ])*. W e  r ev i se  
A us ing  E q .  (4) a n d  v5 w i t h  I -- 3 a n d  J = 1, s ince t h e  f o u r t h  sou rce  
conf l ic t s  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  th ree .  A d d i n g  a n y  n u m b e r  of  o t h e r  sources  m e r e l y  
r equ i r e s  a c h a n g e  in  t h e  v a l u e  of  p a r a m e t e r  vs. 
O u r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  for  A in t h e  c o n f i r m i n g  a n d  conf l i c t ing  cases  has  
g r e a t e r  g e n e r a l i t y  t h a n  m i g h t  be  s u p p o s e d  f r o m  o u r  d e v e l o p m e n t s  t h u s  
far .  W e  h a v e  o n l y  b e e n  c o n c e r n e d  t h u s  fa r  w i t h  in fe rences  i n v o l v i n g  t w o  
d i s jo in t  h y p o t h e s e s  H1 a n d  H~. N o w  suppose  t h a t  ou r  in fe rences  c o n c e r n  
a d i s j o i n t  class {HI, H2, . . • , H i ,  . . . Hm} of h y p o t h e s e s  w h i c h  m a y  
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or m a y  no t  be  exhaus t ive .  To revise our  opinions  abou t  t he  r e l a t ive  l ike-  
liness of t he  m hypo theses  on the  bas is  of a jo in t  confl ict ing or conf i rming 
repor t s  in class {R1, R2, • • • , R,d we need on ly  ca lcu la te  t he  m -  1 
i n d e p e n d e n t  va lues  of A. This  requires  knowledge  of p~ for eve ry  H~ and  
a p p r o p r i a t e  va lues  of vk. 
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